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Commentators have observed that the field of private international law
is mired in the past. To update and adapt to an increasingly interconnected
world, it should consider how other fields of international dispute
resolution have changed to the evolving face of globalization in the past
decade.
Private international law has been traditionally limited to developing
rules to decide the proper forum and applicable law for transnational
disputes, and to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in municipal courts. The result is a field of mechanical rules
that point parties to the right court and the proper law, with little regard to
what that court does or what that law says. It has served the role of an
international prothonotary – a mere guidepost for transnational actors
seeking justice on the international plane.
This may have been sufficient in centuries past, where “international”
discourse was largely limited to regional interactions among legal systems
of similar traditions and competencies. But, in the last few decades, that
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discourse has become truly global. In U.S. federal courts, there were only
15 published opinions addressing proof of foreign law between 1966 and
1971, covering the laws of 12 different foreign countries. In the past five
years, there have been more than 125 published decisions, covering the
laws of approximately 50 foreign countries. The increased number of cases
is mirrored by the increased range and complexity of the foreign laws at
issue—from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, Nicaragua and Iraq.
Of course, all of these foreign states unilaterally proclaim themselves
to be un Estado de derecho, but these are often mere words. All too often,
“[t]he more dictatorial the regime, the more surrealistically gorgeous” its
laws.1 The reality is that adherence to basic notions of justice is still a
startling anomaly in today’s world.2 With this in mind, the field of private
international law must stop worrying about mechanical methods and
grammatical texts, and begin operating in realistic contexts. Too often this
discipline is over-concerned with the applicability of laws, but not the
validity of laws; with proper methodology, but not judicious results. This
article proposes that, in order to play a meaningful role in the resolution of
modern transnational disputes, the field of private international law must
play a meaningful role in explicating the substance of those municipal laws
applied to the transnational scenario.
The means by which this explication may occur is nothing new within
the field of international law writ large. For over a century international
judges have observed that there are certain minimum, corrective principles
inherent in every legal system. These “general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations” derive from the consensus of municipal
legal systems in foro domestic, and while they are grounded in the positive
law of nation states, they rest alongside custom and treaties as a primary
source of international law. They seek to define the fundamentals of
substantive justice and procedural fairness, and have been applied by the
International Court of Justice, international investment tribunals, and
commercial arbitration panels time and again to reach judicious results
when the applicable law otherwise would not. Taken together, these
general principles form an emerging notion of international due process by
which local legal processes are judged beyond their own sovereign borders.
Just as they do on the international plane, these general principles can play
a material role when a transnational case comes to a municipal court.
Applying these principles to inform the proper choice of law; to assist

1. Jan Paulsson, Enclaves of Justice 1, (University of Miami Law Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 2010-29), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1707504.
2. See id. (referring to the “Fraudulent Consensus on the Rule of Law”).
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in the interpretation and application of that law; or to assess the adequacy
of a foreign judicial decision under a truly international standard; falls
squarely within the bailiwick of private international law. Scholars,
advocates, and judges operating in this field should take heed of these
universal principles of law in cases that incorporate a foreign element; they
should explicate them and apply them to achieve a result that is not only
fair to the parties, but one that also advances minimum international
standard of justice more generally. This trend may have already started,
but it should be encouraged to continue, in order to move private
international law alongside other disciplines of international dispute
resolution.
I. THE RECURRING HYPOTHETICAL AND THE INFLUENCE OF
PROFESSOR BIN CHENG
The annals of legal history are full of recurring tales. On the
international plane, perhaps the most common is the nationalization decree
used to expropriate foreign investment. We can crib the facts from any
number of recent cases, or take them from the tomes of centuries past, but
perhaps the best hypothetical was written by Jan Paulsson in a 2009
article.3 It goes something like this:
Rex has recently installed himself as the benevolent dictator of a
resource-rich country. He took power from a government he accuses of
having distributed national wealth in a grossly unfair manner, and he
enjoys passionate popularity among the vast disadvantaged segments of the
population. He accuses foreign business interests of having colluded with
formerly powerful national elites. In pursuit of his policies, Rex decides to
abrogate international treaties and rewrite national laws. With that, he also
decides to nullify contracts made with foreign investors and expropriate
foreign assets in the name of redistributive justice. His political majority
will support him, as will the legislators and judges he has hand-picked for
office. Rex insists that he respects the rule of law, but by “law” he means
the rules he has put into place to further his policies.4 A legal action by an
aggrieved foreign investor under that law may be futile.5 This is not only
because Rex’s courts are often packed with his cronies, but also because
any court that applies Rex’s laws as they are drafted and enacted will be
obliged to reach the same conclusion. And the discipline of private

3. Jan Paulsson, Unlawful Laws and the Authority of International Tribunals, 23 ICSID Rev.—
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 215, 221-22 (2008).
4. For a further discussion of “the law” as opposed to mere “laws,” see infra note 146.
5. See Paulsson, supra note 4, at 221-22.
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international law, as it is traditionally conceived, reflexively points to
Rex’s laws as the rule of decision in transnational cases. Rex thus has free
reign to abrogate his international contracts, even contracts to arbitrate,6 by
the stroke of a pen.
International law has had to develop the mechanisms to deal with the
“Rex’s” of the world. For a time, these types of disputes were left to the
discretion of negotiating sovereigns, who would espouse an investor’s
international claims against other states. Modern bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) changed all that. Private companies no longer depend on
the discretion of their home states in the context of diplomatic protection as
to whether a claim should be raised against another state.7 They can bring
an international claim against their host sovereign themselves.8 But, in
some respects, all sovereigns are similar to Rex. They all find it
intolerable, or at least inconvenient, that an external authority could be
allowed to determine what is lawful or unlawful in their own territory.9 So,
as a choice of law limitation, most BITs point to applying the respondent
state’s law when an investment tribunal is asked to adjudicate its breach of
contract with a covered investor. The investor is thus protected against the

6. See, e.g., Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 499 F. Supp. 2d 452, 461, 463, 466
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that “extensive formalities” for state-contracting and an Ecuadorian
Constitutional provision prohibiting state-owned entities from submitting to a “foreign jurisdiction”
precluded any reasonable reliance on a contract—and its arbitration clause—that had been followed by
the contracting parties for over two decades); cf. Bitúmenes Orinoco S.A. v. New Brunswick Power
Holding Corp., No. 05 Civ. 9485(LAP), 2007 WL 485617, at *18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2007)
(refusing, for lack of proof, a state-owned entity’s attempt to free itself from a contract to arbitrate by
pointing to a Venezuelan law that stripped its board of directors from any authority to enter into the
contract).
7. See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Arbitration of Foreign Investment Disputes – An Introduction, in
NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND 125, 125-31 (Albert Jan
van den Berg ed., 2005); JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 1-15 (1999); M. SORNARAJAH, THE
SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 61-84 (2000).
8. There are presently over 2,000 bilateral and regional investment treaties that provide for the
compulsory arbitration of investment disputes between investors and their host state. During the 1990s,
roughly 1,500 BITs were concluded, and the inclusion of states’ consents to investment arbitration
became the norm. This wave of new treaties were not confined to the conventional relationship
between capital-exporting and capital-importing states; developing states, too, began to sign investment
treaties among themselves. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trends in
International Investment Agreements: An Overview 33-34, U.N. Doc. UNTAD/ITE/IIT/13 (1999).
Cases and controversies soon followed; from 1995 to 2004, ICSID registered four times as many claims
as in the previous 30 years, and the growth trend appears to be sustaining. This is only a snapshot of the
explosion of investment arbitration because ICSID is only one forum for these disputes. Other forums,
such as the ICC’s International Court of Arbitration or ad hoc tribunals established under the
UNCITRAL Rules, are also available for investor-state disputes, and these fora normally keep cases
confidential unless both disputing parties agree otherwise.
9. See Paulsson, supra note 4, at 222.
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inherent bias of Rex’s legal process, but not from the bias of Rex’s “laws”
themselves.
So international law has taken the next logical step and developed a
safety valve for dealing with Rex’s “laws.” An international tribunal’s
authority to determine and apply national law is plenary, so it is proper for
it to refuse to apply “unlawful laws.”10 The mechanism by which it does
this varies, but one common approach is to apply “general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations” as a corrective norm. There is a real
convergence of certain long-standing and baseline principles of contract,
procedure, causation, and liability in the municipal laws of the world,
regardless of the one-off decrees that are passed for political expediency.
The principles become “general” principles, and thus a primary source of
international law, when they are deemed “universally recognized” by most
civilized legal systems.11 Once divined, these principles will “prevail over
domestic rules that might be incompatible with them,” such that “the law of
the host state can be applied” where there is no conflict, but “[s]o too can
[universal principles] be applied” to correct or supplant those national laws
that are in disharmony with minimum international standards.12 So where,
for instance, an international investment tribunal accepts that Egyptian law
is the proper law of the contract, it may likewise conclude that “Egyptian
law must be construed so as to include such principles [and the] national
laws of Egypt can be relied upon only in as much as they do not contravene
said principles.”13 The goal is to produce decisions that are grounded in
positive law, but still detached from the constraints of domestic dogmatism

10. Id. at 224.
11. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1953); Vladimir-Djuro Degan, General Principles of Law
(A Source of General International Law), 3 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 46 (1992); Wolfgang Friedmann,
The Uses Of “General Principles” in the Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 279,
280-81 (1963); Michael D. Nolan and Frédéric G. Sourgens, Issues of Proof of General Principles of
Law in International Arbitration, 3 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 505, 505 (2009).
12. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on
Application for Annulment, ¶¶ 40-44 (Feb. 5, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 933 (2002); accord Amco v. Republic of
Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Award, ¶ 40 (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413 (1993)
(“applicable host-state laws . . . must be checked against international laws, which will prevail in case
of conflict”).
13. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/3, Award, ¶ 84 (May 20, 1992), 8 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 328, 352 (1993)
(“When . . . international law is violated by the exclusive application of municipal law, the Tribunal is
bound . . . to apply directly the relevant principles and rules of international law. . . . [S]uch a process
‘will not involve the confirmation or denial of the validity of the host State’s law, but may result in not
applying it where that law, or action taken under that law, violates international law” (quoting A.
Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 331, 342 (1972))).
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and the idiosyncrasies of local law; for tribunals to display the same sort of
“pragmatic functionality” that brings disputing parties to international
arbitration in the first place.14
One good example is the case of World Duty Free Company Ltd. v.
The Republic of Kenya.15 In 1989, a UK company had concluded an
agreement with the government for the construction, maintenance, and
operation of duty-free complexes at the Nairobi and Mombassa airports.
Later, as alleged by Claimant, the government sought to cover-up a
massive internal fraud by expropriating and liquidating Claimant’s local
assets, including its rights under the 1989 Agreement. Claimant sought,
inter alia, restitution for breach of the contract, which awkwardly
referenced both Kenyan and English law as the governing law.
Kenya defended on the basis that the 1989 Agreement was “tainted
with illegality” and thus unenforceable because it was procured upon the
payment of a USD 2 million bribe from the Claimant to the former
President of Kenya. Claimant did little to rebut the factual basis for that
defense, but instead argued that “it was routine practice to make such
donations in advance of doing business in Kenya” and that “said practice
had cultural roots” in Kenya and was “‘regarded as a matter of protocol by
the Kenyan people.’”16 “[S]ufficient regard to the domestic public policy,”
Claimant argued, required the Tribunal to uphold the contract
notwithstanding the bribe.17
The Tribunal first divined, and then applied, “an international
consensus as to universal standards and accepted norms of conduct that
must be applied in all fora.”18 After surveying arbitral jurisprudence, a
number of international conventions, decisions of domestic courts, and
various domestic laws, the Tribunal concluded that “bribery or influence
peddling . . . are sanctioned by criminal law in most, if not all, countries.”19
As a result, this consensus could be considered a general principle of
English and Kenyan law, so “it is thus unnecessary for this Tribunal to
consider the effect of a local custom which might render legal locally what

14. See Klaus Peter Berger, General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration:
How to Find Them—How to Apply Them, 5 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 97, 105-06 (2011); see
also Yves Derains, The Application of Transnational Rules in ICC Arbitral Awards, 5 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION REV. 173, 193 (2011) (noting a “trend among international arbitrators which seeks to
challenge the adequacy of applying national laws when resolving transnational disputes”).
15. ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (Oct. 4, 2006).
16. Id. ¶¶ 110, 120, 134.
17. Id. ¶ 120.
18. Id. ¶ 139.
19. Id. ¶ 142.
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would otherwise violate transnational public policy.”20 Even “[i]f it had
been necessary,” the Tribunal noted, it would have been “minded to
decline . . . to recognise any local custom in Kenya purporting to validate
bribery committed by the Claimant in violation of international public
policy.”21 The Tribunal cited a similar approach taken by the UK House of
Lords in Kuwait v Iraqi Airways, which is discussed below. Thus,
“Claimant is not legally entitled to maintain any of its pleaded claims in
these proceedings on the ground of ex turpi causa non oritur action,” the
general principle of law that “[n]o court will lend its aid to a man who
founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act.”22
Similar facts were presented in Inceysa Vallisoletana v. El Salvador,
and the tribunal also decided the case in a similar fashion.23 In Inceysa, a
Spanish company signed a contract to provide industrial services to the
Republic of El Salvador. It alleged before an ICSID Tribunal that the
Republic breached that contract and expropriated its rights under it. For its
part, El Salvador alleged that the Claimant only procured the contract
through fraud, and therefore cannot claim any protections under the
relevant BIT. But the Claimant had two separate decisions of the Supreme
Court of El Salvador that sustained the legality of the bidding process for
the contract; it alleged that those decisions were res judicata on the issue of
Claimant’s alleged fraud.
The Tribunal agreed that the legality of the contract depended upon
the “laws and governing legal principles in El Salvador.”24 Primary among
those laws was the relevant BIT, which was incorporated into domestic law
by the Constitution, and provides for the application of “international law”
to disputes regarding foreign investments.25 Because “the general
principles of law are an autonomous or direct source of international law,”
the Tribunal held that they may be applied as “general rules on which there
is international consensus” and “rules of law on which the legal systems of
[all] States are based.”26
While res judicata is one of those general principles, and decisions of
the El Salvadorian Supreme Court should usually be binding when the
applicable law is that of El Salvador, the Tribunal decided the issue of its

20. Id. ¶ 172.
21. Id.
22. Id. ¶¶ 179, 181.
23. Inceysa Vallisoletana v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award (Aug. 2, 2006),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0424_0.pdf.
24. Id. ¶ 218.
25. Id. ¶¶ 219-24.
26. Id. ¶ 227.
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own competence without limitation from the national judgments.
Reviewing the legality of the investment contract de novo, the Tribunal
concluded that Claimant violated at least three general principles of law in
its procurement. First, it violated the “supreme principle” of good faith,
which, in the context of contractual relations, requires the “absence of
deceit and artifice in the negotiation and execution of [legal]
instruments.”27 Second, it violated the principle of nemo auditor propiam
turpitudinem allegans, which means that it cannot “seek to benefit from an
investment effectuated by means of [an] illegal act.”28 And third, “the acts
committed by [claimant] during the bidding process [we]re in violation of
the legal principle that prohibits unlawful enrichment.”29 This principle,
the Tribunal found, was codified in the “written legal systems of the
nations governed by the Civil Law system,” and provides that “when the
cause of the increase in the assets of a certain person is illegal, such
enrichment must be sanctioned by preventing its consummation.”30
Accordingly, “the systematic interpretation” of El Salvadorian law,
underpinned by “the general principles of law,” must deny Claimant the
right to access the jurisdiction of the Tribunal – irrespective of what the El
Salvadorian Supreme Court may have already said on the matter.31
In 1953, Professor Bin Cheng wrote the seminal book on the type of
“general principles” invoked in these investor-state arbitrations. Cheng set
forth five general categories of substantive concepts that are commonly
recognized by civilized nations. Basic notions like pacta sunt servanda
and res judicata are among the most commonly recognized principles,
expressed as Latin maxims to demonstrate their permanence and
universality. Testifying to the importance of these principles of universal
law, Professor Bin Cheng’s 60 year-old book remains one of the most cited
treatises by international tribunals.
But is this a unique phenomenon of investment law? As a source of
law listed in the ICJ Statute, is it limited to public international law? To be
sure, lawyers not dedicated to non-state mechanisms like international
arbitration tend to cling to what they know; they tend to fight with the
national law with which they are familiar, and only begrudgingly accept
foreign law as a rule of decision. In the U.S. at least, “the tendency of the
federal courts is to duck and run when presented with issues of foreign

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. ¶ 231.
Id. ¶ 242.
Id. ¶ 253.
Id. ¶ 254.
Id. ¶¶ 218, 263.
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law,”32 and they may run faster when that foreign law is an amalgam of
ancient principles divined from a comparative exercise. But the perception
may not approximate historical reality: national courts may be looking – or
perhaps should be looking – in the direction of these fundamental
transnational rules.
The notion of “general principles” as a formal source of law before the
International Court of Justice came about when European national courts
were still reeling with post-WWII trauma. The Continental European
tradition of mechanically applying written laws with extreme formalism
was blamed for the grave injustices perpetuated by the courts of Nazi
Germany and Vichy France.33 When the war ended, the general principles
– or principes generaux – obtained favor in France as a reaction against the
Vichy period, in which French wartime courts blithely applied Vichy
enactments, offering an alternative source to effectuate justice where the
written law fails.34
If the general principles obtained some acceptance in Europe – despite
the generalized distaste in civil law for anything outside the Code – they
obtained even greater acceptance in the common law systems.35 In 1960,
the Government of the Republic of Cuba established Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba (“Bancec”) to serve as an official autonomous
credit institution for foreign trade. That same year, all of Citibank’s assets
in Cuba were seized and nationalized by the Cuban Government.
Separately, but soon thereafter, Bancec acquired a letter of credit issued by
Citibank arising from a sugar transaction with a Canadian company. But
when Bancec brought suit on the letter of credit in the United States,
Citibank counter-claimed, asserting a right to set off the value of its seized
Cuban assets. Citibank could only do so, though, if Bancec was deemed
the alter ego of the Government of Cuba, and thus responsible for the
expropriation. Cuban law was the natural choice of law, and Cuban law

32. Roger J. Miner, The Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S. Federal Courts, 432 AM. J. COMP.
L. 581, 581 (1995).
33. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period in France
and Germany of Judicial Methodology’s Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 101, 103,
142-48 (2001-2002) (citing, inter alia, JACQUES GHESTIN & GILLES GOUBEAUX, TRAITE DE DROIT
CIVIL: INTRODUCTION GENERALE (1977)).
34. Id. at 142, 147.
35. This, of course, happens most often where the statute directs the court to “international law”
as the rule of decision—as in the case of the Alien Tort Statute. See, e.g., Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, dissenting) (arguing for the application of a
“principle which is found to be generally accepted by civilized legal systems”); see generally David W.
Rivkin, A Survey of Transnational Legal Principles in U.S. Courts, 5 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV.
231, 234-37 (2011).
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maintained strict separation between the company and the State, thus
immunizing Bancec.
The case wound its way through the federal courts; the district court
sided with Citibank on finding Bancec sufficiently aligned with the
Government of Cuba, but the Second Circuit – applying Cuban law –
reversed. The case ultimately came to be heard before the U.S. Supreme
Court, which, in an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
disclaimed blind adherence to Cuban law, or even U.S. law, and instead
applied “principles of equity common to international law and federal
common law.”36 These “controlling principles,” it said, were divined in
large part by U.S. federal common law, supplemented by principles
adopted by “governments throughout the world.” These principles formed
the rule of decision on whether Bancec should be accorded separate legal
status from the Government of Cuba.
Citing studies of English law,37 Soviet law,38 and comparative studies
by both scholars and NGOs39 — while discarding some principles applied
by foreign courts as “not . . . universally acceptable,”40 — the Court held
that “[s]eparate legal personality” and “[l]imited liability is the rule, not the
exception.”41 However, after referring to various authorities on European
civil law42 and international decisions collecting “the wealth of practice
already accumulated on the subject in municipal law[s]” around the
world,43 the Court held that Bancec’s independent corporate status could be
disregarded in this instance, and that it could be held to answer in a U.S.
court for Citibank’s expropriation in Cuba. Ultimately, this result was “the
product of the application of internationally recognized equitable principles
to avoid the injustice that would result from permitting a foreign state to
reap the benefits of our courts while avoiding the obligations of
international law.”
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE REGULATION OF
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE RELATIONSHIPS
What Justice O’Connor did in Bancec is not completely novel,

36. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S. 611,
613 (1983).
37. Id. at 624 n.13; see also id. at 625 n.16, 626 n.18.
38. Id. at 624 n.13
39. Id.
40. Id. at 626 n.18.
41. Id. at 626.
42. Id. at 628 n.20.
43. Id.
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whether in the United States or abroad. In that case, the foreign
instrumentality’s primary argument was that the law of the place of its
incorporation – there, Cuba – should govern the substantive questions
relating to its structure and internal affairs.44 To be sure, “[a]s a general
matter,” the incorporating state’s law typically governs to achieve
“certainty and predictability” for “parties with interests in the
corporation.”45 But that rule is not absolute. According to the Court, “[t]o
give conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in determining
whether the separate juridical status of its instrumentality should be
respected would permit th[at] state to violate with impunity the rights of
third parties under international law while effectively insulating itself from
liability in foreign courts. We decline to permit such a result.” Nemo iudex
in causa sua.46 In the place of Cuban law, the Court applied “principles . . .
common to both international law and federal common law,” as explicated
by “governments throughout the world.”47 In other words, the Court
applied those aspects of U.S. common law consonant with “general
principles recognized by civilized nations.”
That phrase was inserted into article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice as one of the five sources of international
law. It encompasses the positive, private laws of all national judicial
systems, distilled to their base norms by a deductive and then comparative
analysis.48 Among the examples of the general principles cited in the
travaux preparatoires of the ICJ Statute are res judicata, good faith, certain
points of procedure (like burden of proof), proscription of abuse of rights,
and lex specialis generalibus derogat.49 These principles are, in a way,
state practice in foro domestic, and states are bound to them in the same
way they are bound to customary international law that stems from the
concordance of their practice on the international plane.50 As stated by one
U.S. judge, “[p]rivate [domestic] law, being in general more developed
44. Id. at 621.
45. Id.
46. See Cheng, supra note 12, at 279 (“No one can be judge in his own cause.”).
47. First Nat’l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 623-24.
48. See generally Michael D. Nolan & Frederic G. Sourgens, Issues of Proof of General
Principles of Law, 3 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 505 (2009).
49. Cheng, supra note 12, at 25-26.
50. See Olufemi Elias & Chin Lin, General Principles of Law, Soft Law and the Identification of
International Law, 28 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 25-26 (1997). Indeed, the division between custom and
general principles of law is often not very clear. In its broadest sense, customary international law may
include all that is unwritten in international law, but in Article 38(a)(1), custom is strictly confined to
what is a general practice among States and accepted by them as law. For the general principles, there
is the element of recognition on the part of civilized peoples but the requirement of a general practice
among States is absent. What is important for Article 38(a)(3) is general practices within States.
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than international law, has always constituted a sort of reserve store of
principles upon which the latter has been in the habit of drawing . . . for the
good reason that a principle which is found to be generally accepted by
civilized legal systems may fairly be assumed to be so reasonable as to be
necessary to the maintenance of justice under any system.”51 So
international tribunals, or national courts faced with a transnational case,
have this reserve store of principles that form an international minimum
standard of due process and fairness – based not on their own parochial
views, but on the universal views of all legal systems.
There are also examples of this practice outside the United States.
During the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, ten commercial airplanes
belonging to Kuwait Airlines were seized by Iraq. After the First Gulf
War, Kuwait Airways subsequently brought an action in the UK against
Iraq Airways for the aircrafts’ return. In transnational cases like this,
English courts typically apply the “double actionability rule,” which
requires that the act be tortious in England and civilly actionable in Iraq
before an action will lie.52 But, under a special provision of Iraqi law,
those seized aircraft were legally transferred to Iraqi Airways after the war.
The Plaintiff conceded this legal point, but argued that the English Court
should “altogether disregard” that Iraqi law.
The “normal position,” according to the court, was to follow its
precedent on choice of law and apply “the laws of another country even
though those laws are different from the law of the forum court.”53 And,
while the confiscatory Iraqi law was likely a violation of public
international law, “breach of international law by a state is not, and should
not be, a ground for refusing to recognise a foreign decree.”54 While this
latter principle “is not discretionary,”55 the ultimate choice of law is, and
“blind adherence to foreign law can never be required of an English court.”
In exceptional cases, “a provision of foreign law will be disregarded when
it would lead to a result wholly alien to fundamental requirements of
justice . . . [That is,] when it would violate some fundamental principle of
justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal.”56 In that situation, “the court will decline

51. Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, dissenting)
(quoting J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 62-63 (6th ed. 1963)).
52. Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co., [2002] UKHL 19, ¶ 12, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd020516/kuwait-1.htm.
53. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
54. Id. ¶ 24.
55. Id.
56. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
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to enforce or recognise the foreign decree to whatever extent is required in
the circumstances”57– even though it will continue to apply that foreign law
as a whole.
That was the result in the case of Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi
Airways. The Iraqi decree transferring legal title of foreign seized property
no doubt violated international law: “Having forcibly invaded Kuwait,
seized its assets, and taken KAC’s aircraft from Kuwait to its own territory,
Iraq adopted this decree as part of its attempt to extinguish every vestige of
Kuwait’s existence as a separate state.”58 The decree was then plead by
Iraqi Airways as an impediment to Plaintiff’s claim under the “double
actionability rule.” But according to the English Court, “[an] expropriatory
decree made in these circumstances and for this purpose is simply not
acceptable today, . . . [and constitutes] a gross violation of established rules
of international law of fundamental importance.”59 Implicit in the decision
is the principle of nullus commodum capere de sua injuria propria (no one
can be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong). The foreign decree
that would have otherwise governed the case was excised from Iraqi law
and entirely ignored. Because the torts of conversion and usurpation were
recognized in England and Iraq, respectively, and amply proven by
Plaintiffs, under both English and Iraqi law the Plaintiff’s claim was
sustained.60
General principles of law often form an essential and functioning part
of the civil law as well. To fill lacunae, many Civil Codes requires judges
57. Id. ¶ 17.
58. Id. ¶ 28.
59. Id. ¶ 29.
60. This is not to suggest that the general principles should abrogate the longstanding adherence
to the “act of state” doctrine. In the United States, for instance, the act of state doctrine requires courts
to presume valid acts of a foreign sovereign taken within its territory, and to refuse to adjudicate cases
that require the court to assess their validity within that territory. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Envt’l Tectonics Corp. 493 U.S. 400, 407 (1990) (“a seizure by a state cannot be complained of
elsewhere in the sense of being sought to be declared ineffective elsewhere.”). The Kuwait Airways
case, however, is different because the English court was not purporting to declare the seizure
ineffective inside Iraq; it just refused to apply the expropriatory law as the rule of decision in its courts
(that is, outside of Iraq). This is something that U.S. courts also can—and must—do. See, e.g., Maltina
Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1972) (“our courts will not give
‘extraterritorial effect’ to a confiscatory decree of a foreign state, even where directed against its own
nationals.”). Whether the foreign law will be ignored in this instance is typically a function of local
“public policy.” See id. at 78 (“We hold that it is our duty to assess, as a matter of federal law, the
compatibility with the laws and policy of this country of depriving the original owners of [their]
property without compensating them for it.” (emphasis added)). This article posits in § IV, infra, that
perhaps the amalgam of fundamental legal principles adopted by civilized countries is a more just
benchmark than the “unruly horse” of local public policy. Richardson v. Mellish (1824), 2 Bing 229,
252 (Burrough, J.) (“Public policy is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never
know where it will carry you”).
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to reference “the general principles of universal law”,61 and many Codes of
Civil Procedure instruct courts to decide legal issues “with clarity, based on
the law and the merits of the process and, in the absence of law, [on] the
principles of universal justice.”62 But while provisions like these are not
exceptional in the civil law, their use is. With a tradition steeped in
positivism and formalism, there is a concern that judges will employ
general principles to impose their own unpredictable legal norms, rather
than following the norms imposed by the legislature – what the French
might condemn as a “gouvernement de juges.”63 But some civil law
scholars, heeding the lessons from the pre-WWII era, are beginning to
eschew this cramped viewpoint of the civil law for something much more
flexible.64 Indeed, at least some national civil codes expressly direct judges
to decide cases according to the spirit of their nation’s laws – a spirit
conveyed by the entirety of the Code.65
III. INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS AS A MINIMUM
CORRECTIVE STANDARD
The “general principles of law” are not a tool of oppression; they are
not just a way to correct idiosyncratic and exotic laws. Their procedural
element, in fact, works just the opposite effect.
Arriving at one definition of substantive justice in a transnational case
is a difficult thing. Every state has vastly different procedures to determine
what is “justice,” and those procedures produce vastly different final
judgments. But when recognition of those judgments is sought abroad, the
enforcement state must ascertain whether they meet minimum standards of
justice before giving them its imprimatur.
Like the discretionary
application of foreign law, “[n]ations are not inexorably bound to enforce
judgments obtained in each other’s courts.” In the United States, as in
many national courts, “[i]t has long been the law . . . that a foreign
judgment cannot be enforced if it was obtained in a manner that did not
accord with the basics of due process.”66 Similarly, if an individual
61. Civil Code, art. 18 (Ecuador); see also Code of Civil Procedure, art. 8 (Venez.); Code of
Criminal Procedure, art. 134 (Arg.); Code of Civil Procedure, art. 274 (Ecuador); Constitución Política
de la República de Chile [C.P.], art. 54; Constitution, arts. 3, 9, 11 (Arm.); Constitution, art. 24 (Bulg.);
Code of Civil Procedure, art. 145 (Bol.); Code of Civil Procedure, art. 2 (Kaz.).
62. Code of Civil Procedure, art. 278 (Ecuador).
63. See Curran, supra note 34, at 148.
64. See id. at 144 (citing, inter alia, Jean Boulanger, Principes généreaux du droit et droit positif,
in 1 LE DROIT FRANCAIS AU MILEAU DU XXE SIÈCLE: ÉTUDES OFFERTES À GEORGES RIPERT 68 (1951)).
65. See Civil Code, art. 1 (Switz.); Civil Code, art. 12 (It.). This sort of judicial methodology has
a long history in Germany, too. See Curran, supra note 34, at 151-66.
66. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1410, 1412 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). By
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aggrieved by a foreign judgment or government decision wants redress for
his gripe on the international level, he can bring an arbitral claim against
the offending state under a relevant BIT (if one indeed exists). That state
will be liable for a denial of justice if the decision was tainted by a
“flagrant abuse of judicial procedure”67 or “fundamental breaches of due
process.”68 In both scenarios, while “[a]n alien usually must take [a
foreign] legal system as he finds it, with all its deficiencies and
imperfections,”69 “[t]he sovereign right of a state to do justice cannot be
perverted into a weapon for circumventing its obligations toward aliens
who must seek the aid of its courts.”70 In both scenarios, there is an
international minimum standard of justice that must be done. And, as we
will see below, the national and international inquiries largely overlap.
This is because, for nearly as long as individuals were engaging each other
across national borders, there has existed a rudimentary code of
“international due process” consisting of “certain minimum standards in the
administration of justice of such elementary fairness and general
application in the legal systems of the world that they have become

design and necessity, the “basics” are not parochial; the standard is not “intended to bar the enforcement
of all judgments of any foreign legal system that does not conform its procedural doctrines to the latest
twist and turn of our courts.” Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
Indeed, the statute requires only that the foreign procedure be “compatible with the requirements of due
process of law,” not ‘equivalent’ to the requirements of American due process, and “[i]t is a fair guess
that no foreign nation has decided to incorporate [U.S. notions of] due process doctrines into its own
procedural law.” Id. So, while a foreign legal system need not share every jot and tittle of U.S.
jurisprudence, it “must abide by fundamental standards of procedural fairness,” Cunard Steamship Co.
v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1985), and “afford the defendant the basic tenets
of due process,” Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997)—that is, “a concept of fair
procedure simple and basic enough to describe the judicial processes of civilized nations, our peers”—if
it wants its judgments enforced here, Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477. According to Judge Posner of the
United States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, “[w]e’ll call this the ‘international concept of
due process’ to distinguish it from the complex concept that has emerged from [domestic] case law.”
Id.
67. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 155-56 (Feb. 5)
(Tanaka, J., concurring).
68. JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (2005).
69. Salem (U.S.) v. Egypt, 2 R.I.A.A. 1161, 1202 (1932). For instance, in The Affaire du
Capitaine Thomas Melville White, the British Government complained to an arbitral tribunal that the
arrest of one of its citizens in Peru was illegal. The tribunal, however, had “little doubt” that “the rules
of procedure to be observed by the courts in [Peru] are to be judged solely and alone according to the
legislation in force there.” See Décision de la commission, chargée, par le Sénat de la Ville libre
hanséatique de Hambourg, de prononcer dans la cause du capitaine Thomas Melville White, datée de
Hambourg du 13 avril 1864, in Henri La Fontaine, PASICRISIE INTERNATIONALE, 1794-1900: HISTOIRE
DOCUMENTAIRE DES ARBITRAGES INTERNATIONAUX, 48 (Kluwer 1997) (1902).
70. J. Irizarry y Puente, The Concept of Denial of Justice in Latin America, 43 MICH. L. REV. 383
(1944).
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international legal standards.”71
One might think that the mutual interests of international commerce
and the rule of law would espouse an incredibly high standard of “due
process” in both scenarios. It doesn’t. The cross-border movement of legal
rights and judgments depends largely upon a “spirit of co-operation”
among states, which in the end is guided by “many values” beyond
substantive justice, “among them predictability, . . . ease of commercial
interactions, and stability through satisfaction of mutual expectations.”72
To satisfy these needs, international challenges to judgments and judicial
recognition of the same do not turn on American, common law, or even
Western notions of “due process.” Rather, as we will see below, they turn
on “a concept of fair procedure simple and basic enough to describe the
judicial processes of civilized nations.”73 Stated otherwise, in both the
national and international scenario, the applicable standard of due process
requires only “justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such general
acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part of the international
law of the world.”74
This notion of international due process is drawn from the general
principles of law. But rather than supplanting and correcting-upward a
deficient foreign law before it is applied in a local court, international due
process corrects-downward the parochial notions of local due process to
grant greater leeway to foreign judgments. Drawing on our prior
discussion of “Rex,” this deferential standard aims to help his minimallyadequate decisions and judgments gain international approval (provided, of
course, that they are minimally adequate); not supplant them with a
different set of processes, priorities and rules. In this way, the general
principles coalesce around this one minimum standard of treatment to
which all states can, and must, strive to attain.
For well over a century, U.S. jurisprudence has itself compiled a
laundry list of elements that undergird the ‘international concept of due
process.’ There must be, for instance, an “opportunity for [a] full and fair
trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction”; “regular
proceedings” and not ad hoc procedures; “due [notice] or voluntary

71. Friedmann, supra note 12, at 290.
72. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist., 482 U.S. 522, 543 n.27
(1987).
73. Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
74. Elihu Root, President, Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing
Abroad, Address Before the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Apr. 28-30,
1910), in 4 PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L. 16, 21 (1910), quoted in Edwin Borchard, The “Minimum
Standard” of the Treatment of Aliens, 38 MICH. L. REV. 445, 458 (1940).
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appearance of the defendant”; “a system of . . . impartial administration of
justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other
countries”; and assurances against “fraud in procuring the judgment.”75
Other elements include the assurance that “the judiciary was [not]
dominated by the political branches of government or by an opposing
litigant”; that the defendant was able to “obtain counsel, to secure
documents or attendance of witnesses”; and that the parties “have access to
These “are not mere niceties of American
appeal or review.”76
jurisprudence” but are instead “the ingredients of ‘civilized jurisprudence’”
and “basic due process.”77
These core concepts of international due process can be directly traced
to the general principles of law. As a theoretical matter, both are based in
the positive laws that apply in domestic legal systems. Just as national
principles become general principles when they are universally accepted by
the majority of civilized legal systems, rules of process form the baseline
notion of international due process when they are “simple and basic enough
to describe the judicial processes of civilized nations, our peers.”78
We see this common thread between principles and process as a
matter of practice, too. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that
judgments rendered without service of process or notice are contrary to
“immutable principle[s] of natural justice,”79 “coram non judice,”80 and
void.81 This is not only a general principle of American law, but is also a
“fundamental condition[]” that is “universally prescribed in all systems of
law established by civilized countries.”82 Accordingly, this basic principle
forms a core component of both American due process and international
due process,83 such that judicial judgments, if they were rendered in their

75. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895).
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b (1987).
77. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at
205); see also British Midland Airways Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 1974) (“It
has long been the law that unless a foreign country’s judgments are the result of outrageous departures
from our own notions of ‘civilized jurisprudence,’ comity should not be refused” (quoting Hilton, 159
U.S. at 205)).
78. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477.
79. Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U.S. 466, 475 (1830).
80. Coram non judice means “[o]utside the presence of a judge” or “[b]efore a judge or court that
is not the proper one or that cannot take legal cognizance of the matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
338 (7th ed. 1999).
81. See, e.g., Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. 336, 350-51 (1850).
82. Twining v. New Jersey, 21 U.S. 78, 111 (1908).
83. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 166 (“Every foreign judgment, of whatever nature, in order to be
entitled to any effect, must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and upon
regular proceedings, and due notice.”); Int’l Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana,
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state of origin without proper notice, will almost universally be denied
recognition and enforcement in another state and may even constitute an
international delict if property is seized in the rendering state as a result.84
Similarly, Professor Bin Cheng devoted a chapter of his book on the
General Principles to the notion of audiatur et altera pars, which translates
in practice to the “fundamental requirement of equality between the parties
in judicial proceedings” and their equal right to be heard.85 Elsewhere, he
discussed the maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa, or the
“universally accepted doctrine that no one can be judge in his own
cause,”86 and the principle that requires tribunals to exercise only that
jurisdiction authorized by law (extra compromisum arbiter nihil facere
potest). All three of these general principles have found their way into the
core notions of international due process. Nearly contemporaneously with
Bin Cheng’s book, the Council of Europe drafted the European Convention
on Human Rights, which provided an early attempt to codify an intraEuropean baseline of due process, and included within it the guarantee that
“everyone is entitled to [(1)] a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time [(2)] by an independent and impartial tribunal [(3)] established by
law.”87 Violation of this article can impugn a foreign judgment in both
domestic88 and international89 courts. The parallels between Bin Cheng’s
general principles of law and the ECHR’s baseline notion of due process
are hard to ignore.
Modern soft law codifications, like the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of
Transnational Civil Procedure, provide an even clearer example of many of
the principles underlying international due process.90 For instance, the
SA de CV, 347 F.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Notice is an element of our notion of due process and
the United States will not enforce a judgment obtained without the bare minimum requirements of
notice.”).
84. See, e.g., Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt,
ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award, ¶¶ 146-51 (Apr. 12, 2002), 18 ICSID Rev.–FOREIGN INVESTMENT
L.J. 602 (2003).
85. CHENG, supra note 12, at 291-98.
86. Id. at 279.
87. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. VI, para. 1,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (emphasis
added).
88. See, e.g., Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. v. OAO Rosneft, Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Case No.
200.005.269/01,
Decision,
¶
3.10
(Apr.
28,
2009),
available
at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/170/4135.html (unofficial translation).
89. See, e.g., Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, ¶ 551 (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-106308.
90. Instruments like these are, almost by definition, an attempt to deduce general principles from
a comparative exercise. They are, according to one scholar, “normative instrument[s] that attempt[] to
construct a single unified body of . . . rules from a number of legal systems.” Peter L. Fitzgerald, The
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three general principles that underlie the notion of a fair hearing by a
competent court are listed in the first three articles of that instrument,
which address the “independence [and] impartiality” of judges, their
“jurisdiction over parties,” and the “procedural equality of the parties.”91
The general principle that judgments cannot be rendered without due notice
follows soon thereafter, at article 5.92 That article also catalogues a number
of general principles that have been applied as such by national and
international courts, including the requirement of “effective . . . notice” at
the outset of proceedings, and the “right to submit relevant contentions of
fact and law and to offer supporting evidence” in support of a defense or a
claim.93
Other general principles appear throughout the ALI/UNIDROIT
Principles, too. A claimant bears the burden of proof, and a defendant must
prove all the material facts that are the basis of his defense.94 These are
universal principles that have long been applied as such by domestic and
international courts and tribunals.95 There also is “little, if indeed any
question as to res judicata being a general principle of law” common to all
civilized countries.96 That a second suit is barred by a former adjudication
involving the same subject matter and legal bases is “a principle inherent in
all judicial systems.”97 The Principles, too, are designed to “avoid
repetitive litigation” with detailed rules on claim and issue preclusion.98
International Contracting Practices Survey Project: An Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, Jurists, and Legal Academics in the United
States, 27 J. L. & COMM. 1, 33 (2008); see also Berger, supra note 15, at 109-13.
91. ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, 2004 UNIFORM L. REV, 758,
760-66.
92. Id. at 768.
93. ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 92, art. 5.4; CHENG, supra note 12, at 293; see, e.g.,
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 159 (1895) (To be recognized, a foreign judgment must be the product
of “due allegations and proofs, and opportunity to defend against them.”); Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco
Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1992) (refusing recognition of arbitral award under the due process
defense of the New York Convention, where judge had previously told the claimant that invoices may
be submitted in summary form to prove their claims, only to switch course at the hearing on the merits
and deny the claims for failure to submit the original invoices; “by so misleading [claimant], however
unwittingly, the Tribunal denied [claimant] the opportunity to present its claim in a meaningful
manner.”); Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, 125 F.3d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997) (“When the exclusion
of relevant evidence actually deprived a party of a fair hearing, therefore, it is appropriate to vacate an
arbitral award.”).
94. ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 92, art. 21.
95. See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 12, at 326-335.
96. Id. at 336.
97. PETER R. BARNETT, RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPEL AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: THE PRECLUSIVE
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUGDMENTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 1.12 (2001).
98. ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 92, art. 28, cmt. P-28A.
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And, it has been universally acknowledged that a default judgment cannot
lie until the court has satisfied itself of its jurisdiction and that the claim is
well-founded in fact and law.99 The Principles, too, incorporate this rule.100
When pulled together into a “Transnational [Code of] Civil
Procedure,” as ALI and UNIDROIT have done, these individual principles
form a set of minimum “standards for adjudication of transnational
commercial disputes.”101 In other words, they constitute an attempted
codification of “international due process.”
The application of the international concept of due process is
becoming more common in domestic courts, and we can point to some
high-profile examples. Several years ago, thousands of Nicaraguan citizens
sued Dole Food Company and The Dow Chemical Company in Nicaraguan
courts, alleging that they were exposed to chemicals causing them to be
infertile while working on the defendants’ banana plantations. Nicaraguan
courts applied Special Law 364, which was enacted in Nicaragua
specifically to handle these claims.102 This law assumed the plaintiffs were
indigent and covered their costs, imposed minimum damage amounts,
irrefutable presumptions of causation, summary proceedings, abolition of
the statute of limitations, and strict curtailment of appellate review.103 In
the end, Nicaraguan courts entered over $2 billion in judgments for the
plaintiffs.
When Plaintiffs sought to enforce one of these judgments in Florida,
the defendants objected on numerous grounds, including the lack of due
process that the defendants received in Nicaragua. The court, citing
Ashenden, evaluated the Special Law 364 to determine whether it was
“‘fundamentally fair.’”104 Because it “targets a handful of United States
companies for burdensome and unfair treatment to which domestic
Nicaraguan defendants are never subjected,” the court held that the foreign
judgment should not be recognized or enforced. Specifically:
[T]he legal regime set up by Special Law 364 and applied in this case
does not comport with the “basic fairness” that the “international concept
of due process” requires. It does not even come close. “Civilized
nations” do not typically require defendants to pay out millions of
dollars without proof that they are responsible for the alleged injuries.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 12, at 297.
ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 92, art. 15.3.
Id. at 758.
Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1316-18 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
Id. [BB 4.1][subs ok, as noted above, changed pincite][EK]
Id. at 1327 (citing Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000)).
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Basic fairness requires proof of a connection between a plaintiff’s injury
and a defendant’s conduct (i.e., causation) before awarding millions of
dollars in damages. Civilized nations do not target and discriminate
against a handful of foreign companies and subject them to minimum
damages so dramatically out of proportion with damage awards against
resident defendants. In summary, civilized nations simply do not subject
foreign defendants to the type of discriminatory laws and procedures
mandated by Special Law 364, and the Court cannot enforce the
judgment because it was rendered under a legal system that did not
provide “procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of
law.”105

This admonishment from the court in Osorio didn’t flow from the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, whose “due process”
clause encompasses not only “idiosyncratic jurisprudence”106 on principles
of procedural fairness, but also substantive matters like personal privacy107
and applicable law.108 “It is a fair guess that no foreign nation has decided
to incorporate our due process doctrines into its own procedural law,”109 so
insisting on all of the rigors of our system would undoubtedly stunt the
movement of judgments abroad. The deficient process followed in
Nicaragua violated something far less stringent and more fundamental –
that is, the basic rules of procedural fairness followed by all “[c]ivilized
nations.”110
International norms developed through “discursive synthesis” like this
– that is, the interaction of many different legal traditions and principles –
are always “more likely to be implemented [in national legal systems] and
less likely to be disobeyed [on the international level].”111 In some ways,
this is Harold Koh’s “Transnational Legal Process” on full display –
principles are divined from the interaction of legal systems, those principles
are internalized into a country’s normative system, and a new baseline legal
rule is created which will guide transnational interactions between parties
in the future.112 The result, we can hope, is a compliance pull to the rule of
law, and the optimistic establishment of “enclaves of justice.” In Mexico,

105. Id. at 1345. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
106. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477.
107. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (noting the private nature of the
petitioners’ conduct).
108. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
109. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476.
110. Id. at 477.
111. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 481 (1995).
112. Harold Koh, The Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 204-05 (1996); Harold
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2646 (1997).

KOTUBY MACRO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

432

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

11/5/2013 6:02 PM

[Vol 23:411

for instance, it is reported that NAFTA has encouraged government
officials and courts to avoid conduct that might fall below the international
minimum standard, and thereby be impugned in an international forum.113
A foreign court applying a baseline notion of international due process to
Mexican laws and decisions might exert a similar compliance pull – to the
benefit of foreigners and citizens alike.
Of course, commentators may levy the same criticisms against this
process that have been made since the inception of “general principles” as a
primary source of international law nearly a century ago. Some may
bemoan that “unelected” judges may be given free rein to divine principles
made by “the world community at the expense of state prerogatives,”
where “the interests of the [home] state[] are neither formally nor
effectively represented in th[at] lawmaking process.”114 But, in a
transnational case, there is nothing new about judges applying law that was
made elsewhere; it happens all the time whenever the courts’ own choiceof-law principles so direct. Nor is there anything undemocratic about
judges applying principles that were crystallized outside its territorial
jurisdiction (at least in non-Constitutional matters).115 This is something
that American judges have done since the beginning of the Republic,
whenever they declared rules of customary international law to be part of
“general common law.”116 The process of “finding”117 general principles –
that is, identifying the underlying legal rationale behind a particular rule
and surveying its general acceptance across legal systems – is certainly no
more (and probably less) discretionary than divining a customary
international law.118 And if predictable outcomes is the main concern, and
113. See Paulsson, supra note 2.
114. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 868 (1997).
115. I am not suggesting that these general principles can or should be applied to help discern a
constitutional question. See generally Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in
Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653 (2009). That lively debate of beyond
the scope of this article. I will only note that it is a far lesser intrusion—and far less controversial—to
apply these principles to a transnational civil case, where the parties have litigated their claims overseas
or are actually arguing for the applicability of foreign law.
116. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (U.S. courts variably “apply Federal law,
state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand.”); The Nereide,
13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815) (stating that “the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the
law of the land”).
117. See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555,
1561-62 (1984) (“In a real sense federal courts find international law rather than make it, . . . as is
clearly not the case when federal judges make federal common law pursuant to constitutional or
legislative delegation.”).
118. Harold Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1853 (1998).
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judges cannot be trusted to ensure that predictability, is not a methodology
designed to apply well-accepted and ancient principles better than that
hazards of an uncertain choice of law determination, followed by blind
adherence to idiosyncratic rules?119

IV. THE RELEVANCE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO THE MODERN
ROLE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
The discipline of private international law, defined in its simplest
terms, is the body of authority that regulates private relationships across
national borders, and resolves questions that result from the presence of
foreign elements in legal relationships.120 This doesn’t tell us much, so we
need to dig a bit deeper.
Contrary to what the label suggests, it is also important to
acknowledge that private international law is really not “international law”
at all, in that it does not constitute a set of rights and obligations between
states. Rather, it is municipal law that is applied because of the presence of
a foreign element. By ASIL’s definition it “has a dualistic character,
balancing international consensus with domestic recognition and
implementation, as well as balancing sovereign actions with those of the
private sector.”121
Traditionally, “private international law” does its part to resolve
transnational disputes by pointing parties to the proper forum and the
proper law, without purporting to resolve the substance of a juridical
question. Its rules rarely provide the ultimate solution to a dispute, and it
has been said that this discipline of law “resembles the inquiry office at a
railway station where a passenger may learn the platform at which his train

119. See Emmanuel Galliard, General Principles of Law in International Commercial
Arbitration—Challenging the Myths, 5 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 161, 169 (2011).
120. See, e.g., P.M. North & J.J. Fawcett, CHESHIRE & NORTH’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3,
7 (13th ed. 1999); Private International Law, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
http://www.oas.org/dil/private_international_law.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) (“Private International
Law is the legal framework composed of conventions, protocols, model laws, legal guides, uniform
documents, case law, practice and custom, as well as other documents and instruments, which regulate
relationships between individuals in an international context.”); Private International Law,
AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT,
http://www.ag.gov.au/Internationalrelations/PrivateInternationalLaw/Pages/default.aspx) (last visited
Apr. 1, 2013) (“Private international law is an area of law that deals with civil transactions and disputes
that contain international elements. Also known as ‘conflicts of laws’, the subject is primarily
concerned with developing principles and rules to resolve the following three stages of a legal conflict:
Jurisdiction, Choice of law, Recognition and enforcement of judgments.”).
121. Louise Tsang, Private International Law, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (June
21, 2011), http://www.asil.org/erg/?page=pil.
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starts”—it points parties to the right court and the right law, “[b]ut it says
no more.”122 If this sounds like a simple process, leading to clean and
predictable results, it isn’t. One negative consequence of the inherently
municipal nature of private international law is uncertainty: with little
harmonization of these various rules among states, there is no guarantee
that the same dispute involving a foreign element will be decided in the
same manner from one jurisdiction to another. And even once a choice of
forum and law is made, the chosen law doesn’t always dictate a simple,
judicious, and expected result. The chosen local law applied to the
transnational case can lead to absurd results, and foreign law applied in
local courts can often be even worse.
As the discussion above demonstrates, in order to play a meaningful
role in aiding the resolution of modern transnational disputes, the
authorities that encompass the rules of private international law must play a
role in determining the substance of those municipal laws applied to the
transnational scenario. Like investment tribunals in the past decade-and-ahalf, courts seised with transnational matters and asked to apply foreign
law should develop corrective mechanisms grounded in positive law that
ensure substantive justice from a universal perspective. If we continue to
hew to a mechanical application of the chosen municipal law, and excuse it
with “meretricious concessions to cultural relativism,” we may find
ourselves “complicit with dictators, fanatics and thugs” who have
perpetrated the “fraudulent consensus on the rule of law” worldwide.123 By
the same token, if we continue to rely on the “unruly horse” of local public
policy, or insist on parochial norms to stunt the movement of foreign
judgments around the world, we threaten the very foundation of
international law—that “systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and
goodwill” which furthers the “mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly
functioning international legal reg ime.”124
To some extent, private international law organizations have already
heeded this call. The Hague Conference on Private International Law, for
one, has recently acknowledged the “need, in practice, to facilitate access
to foreign law” as an “essential component to . . . the rule of law and . . .
the proper administration of justice.”125 Efforts like this will make it easier

122. See North & Fawcett, supra note 121, at 8-9.
123. See Paulsson, supra note 2, at 9.
124. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S.
522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law, Feb. 15-17, 2012, Conclusions
and Recommendations on Access to Foreign Law in Civil and Commercial Matters, available at
http://www.oas.org/dil/private_international_law.htm.
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for the national judge to apply the whole law to a particular case – the
underlying universal principles as well as its normative code.126 Moving
one step further, for almost a century the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) has been modernizing,
harmonizing, and coordinating the rules of private commercial law to
formulate uniform law instruments, and numerous treaties have been
concluded between states that effectively do the same.127 And for centuries
before that, lex mercatoria has provided rules of international trade that
have long been used to “clarify, to fill gaps, and to reduce the impact of
peculiarities of individual country’s laws.”128 But insofar as they are
derived from scholarly consensus (in the case of uniform law instruments),
and mercantile usage (in the case of lex mercatoria), these non-state laws
have their obvious drawbacks.129 Municipal courts may not recognize the
choice of non-state codifications to a particular dispute before it. In
Europe, this traces back to Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention, which
stipulates that the Convention governs the “choice between the laws of
different countries.”130 Other provisions, too, especially those dealing with
contracts – such as Articles 3 (3) and 7 (1) – refer to the applicable law as
“the law of a country.” This is true in the United States too. Section 187 of
the Second Restatement of Conflicts, and Sections 1-105 and 1-301 of the
UCC, designate the law to which reference is made as the “law of a state.”
And because “state” is defined in that Restatement as a “territorial unit with
a distinct body of law,” this wording suggests that only the application –
and the choice – of state law is contemplated.131 There is a need, then, for

126. See infra note 146.
127. See, e.g., Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11; Protocol to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air
Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371;
Convention, Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other than the Contracting Carrier, Sept. 18, 1961,
500 U.N.T.S. 31.
128. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s View, in LEX MERCATORIA AND
ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW 71 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1998).
129. See Galliard, supra note 120, at 161-62 (noting that “it would be misleading . . . to equate
general principles with lex mercatoria” because only the former is “rooted in national legal systems”
and identified through a comparative law analysis).
130. Convention 80/934/ECC on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature
in Rome on June 19, 1980.
131. Case law is generally in accord. In Trans Meridian Trading Inc. v. Empresa Nacional de
Comercializacion de Insumos, 829 F.2d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1987), for example, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin payment on an international letter of credit despite the fact that
the contract had been expressly made subject to the “Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary
Credit (UCP)” published by the International Chamber of Commerce, which allowed issuance of an
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an established source of positive law to do what the lex mercatoria does –
to “clarify, to fill gaps, and to reduce the impact of peculiarities of
individual country’s laws.”132
This is precisely where the “general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations” can, and should, enter the field of private international
law. These principles are, by definition, borne from municipal law – or in
the least the distillation of underlying legal principles that give shape to
those positive laws. Again, by definition, they stem from “international
consensus” – before being characterized as general, the judge must deem
them accepted by the majority of legal systems in the world. And they
must also possess some modicum of “domestic recognition” to be accepted
by the forum that seeks to apply them. In the transnational case, involving
litigants from varying legal traditions, a solution premised on international
rather than municipal principles is always the preferred solution; a solution
based on one of the three primary “sources of international law” codified
by the Statute of the International Court of Justice may be the best solution
of all. One could even argue that this source of international law is the one
that is best designed for private international law cases; it is, after all, the
only source that derives from the world’s many municipal codes, which in
and of themselves are designed to apply to the conduct of private
relationships.
To be clear, though, this suggestion is not intended to formulate a new
approach to the choice of law, even though on its face it may look like the
“better law” approach championed by Professor Leflar a half-century
ago,133 or the “principles of preference” introduced by Professor Cavers
decades before that.134 Both sought to announce criteria of rule-selection; a
“choice between laws;”135 a unified theory by which judges could choose
the competing municipal law that would best effect “relevant multistate
policies”136 or some subjective notion of justice.137 What I am suggesting
injunction under the given circumstances. The court held that the UCP was not the law “of a foreign
jurisdiction, but rather . . . a compendium of commercial practices published by the International
Chamber of Commerce.” Therefore, “a provision in a letter of credit that the UCP governs the
transaction” did not “prevent application of California’s Commercial Code.”
132. Lowenfeld, supra note 129, at 149.
133. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 258 (1968).
134. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 64 (1965).
135. LEFLAR, supra note 134, at 258.
136. CAVERS, supra note 135, at 64.
137. I would note, however, that there is no reason why the general principles of law could not
play an important role in the search for the appropriate choice of law. For example, in Eli Lilly do
Brasil, Ltda v. Fed. Express Co., 502 F.3d 78, 81-82 (2d Cir. 2007), Eli Lilly had contracted with
FedEx to ship pharmaceuticals, which were stolen while being transported by truck in Brazil. Eli Lilly
elected to sue in the Southern District of New York instead of Brazil, requiring the court to determine
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comes after a choice of law is made. From there the court ascertains that
law – and, if necessary, invokes certain “general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations” to correct any unjust outcomes perpetuated
by that law. From there that law is applied in this corrected form,
hopefully resulting in “justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such
general acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part of the
international law of the world.”138 At the very least, it results in a chosen
law that eschews parochial outcomes for a transnational dispute. That is
the law that sets sail beyond a state’s borders.
Nor is this an effort to craft a comparative code of conduct applicable
to transnational relationships everywhere. It is much more modest than
that. These principles are distinguishable from rules. “A rule . . . is
essentially practical and, moreover, binding.”139
The Eighth
Commandment, ‘Thou Shalt Not Steal,’ is a fundamental rule, adopted by
every civilized legal system, but its widespread acceptance does not make
it a “general principle of law recognized by civilized nations.”140 Principles
simply “express[] a general truth, which guides our action,” and the action
of legislatures, and “serves as a theoretical basis” for binding rules of
practical application.141 By way of illustration, while theft may be strictly
prohibited as a firm rule, the principle that laws have only prospective
effect142 (for instance) is far less obligatory.
So when a municipal court is given the authority to apply a certain law

whether the federal common law or Brazilian law applied. In conducting its choice of law analysis, the
court recognized that Brazil’s interest under § 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was
greater than the United States’ interest; however, the court noted that this was not the “end of [the]
inquiry or determinative of its conclusion.” The court found that the expectation of enforceability of
contracts should be afforded greater weight than Brazilian law. In reaching this conclusion, the court
applied the following two general principles of law: (1) “the well-settled ‘presumption in favor of
applying that law tending toward the validation of the alleged contract’” and (2) “the general rule of
contract that ‘presumes the legality and enforceability of contracts’”—pacta sunt servanda. Id. at 82;
see also CHENG, supra note 12, at 142. Since these general principles favored enforcing the contract,
they were weighed against Brazil’s interest in having its own law applied. The principle of locus regit
actum—and the greater interest in applying the law of another interested sovereign—was displaced by
the general principle of law that the contract may rather have effect than be nullified. Ut res magis
valeat quam pereat.
138. Root, supra note 75, at 21.
139. CHENG, supra note 12, at 376.
140. See Filartiga v. Pena–Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he mere fact that every
nation’s municipal law may prohibit theft does not incorporate the Eighth Commandment, ‘Thou shalt
not steal’ [into] the law of nations.”); see also Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 249 (2d
Cir. 2003) (“Even if certain conduct is universally proscribed by States in their domestic law, that fact is
not necessarily significant or relevant for purposes of customary international law.”).
141. CHENG, supra note 12, at 376.
142. CHENG, supra note 12, at 141.
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to a transnational case – be it foreign or domestic – its authority is plenary,
and it has the authority to determine foreign law before it applies it. This is
vital, and it means that the whole law, including the superior norms and
foundational principles to the black-letter rules, may be applied.143 A
foreign criminal law that purports to have retroactive effect may be rejected
by the municipal court seised to apply it, for instance, on the grounds that
such laws violate the “general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations” (including, very likely, the nation whose legislature purported to
ignore it). By the same token, a domestic law which requires witnesses to
stand on their head as they testify should not foreclose the enforcement of a
foreign judgment where the trial witnesses stand on their feet; the
international standard of due process demands no more.144 Whatever the
fate of those “unprincipled” rules in the territories of the states that enacted
them, they remain there. The application of the general principles keep the
law145 in good health, even though imperfect “laws” may be passed from
time to time.

143. See, e.g., Paulsson, supra note 2, at 12-13 (describing the multiple levels of rules that apply
to sports). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 is broad enough to encompass a deep study of systemic
norms when asked to discern and apply a foreign law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (“In determining foreign
law, the court may consider any relevant material or source” (emphasis added). Indeed, as Judge Posner
has recently noted, judges are “experts on law,” and thus may resort to the “abundance of published
materials, in the form of treatises, law review articles, statutes, and cases, . . . to provide neutral
illumination of issues of foreign law.” See Bodum, USA, Inc. v. La Cafeitere, Inc., 621 F.3D 624, 633
(7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., concurring). While interested foreign sovereigns often come into U.S. court,
as amicus or otherwise, to espouse a particular interpretation, U.S. courts typically do not give these
proffered interpretations determinative weight without due consideration and assessment of their
correctness within the broader regime of the particular foreign law. See, e.g., Access Telecom, Inc. v.
MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 714 (5th Cir. 1999) (“we do not feel compelled to credit the
[foreign agency’s] determinations without analysis”); McNab v. United States, 331 F.3d 1228, 1241-45
(11th Cir. 2003) (refusing to defer to the Honduran government’s interpretation of its own law because
that interpretation conflicted with the text of three other Honduran statutes). This is the correct
approach, especially when the proffering sovereign has a financial stake in the outcome of the case. But
see Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d 70, 92
(2002) (A foreign sovereign’s views regarding its own laws merit—although they do not command—
”some degree of deference.”); In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1312 (7th Cir. 1992)
(the court owes “substantial deference to the construction a foreign sovereign places upon its domestic
law, because [it has] long recognized the demands of comity in suits involving foreign states, either as
parties, or as sovereigns with a coordinate interest in the litigation”).
144. See, e.g., PAULSSON, supra note 69, at 205.
145. I use the italicized word “the law” in this sense to mean the national law in its totality.
“Laws,” on the other hand, are singular edits, decrees, and the like. Paulsson, supra note 4, at 215. It is
a flaw of the English language that there are not two words to make the distinction. In French, for
instance, when the legislature passes “le lois,” it never dispenses with “le droit.” Replacing the latter
would take a revolution. We are thus speaking here of the equivalent of France’s “le droit”—the
system of legal norms that are the object and instrument of legal order in a society, and which create,
modify, apply and impose respect for that order. Id. at 217 (citing S. ROMANO, L’ORDINAMENTO
GUIRIDICO 10 (1918)).
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Owing to their “inchoate” nature and corrective role, such principles
actually do better resting alongside the black letter rules of municipal law,
guiding the application of municipal law rather than forming a freestanding
rule of decision themselves. For international law writ large, this is
common territory. In many contexts, only once challenges are raised to the
legitimacy or propriety of municipal law is the “[a]ttention . . . immediately
switched to international law, to see whether it may have a corrective
effect, by operation of such things as international minimum standards or
international public policy.”146 This is the norm before investment
tribunals, where the “general principles of law” are very often applied in a
corrective role. This apparent modesty, however, should not be overstated.
As we have seen above, general principles of law can correct a rule of law
in an outcome determinative way, even in municipal courts. When an
otherwise applicable foreign law would shield a state-owned corporation
from liability, and allow it to benefit from its own state’s international
delicts, “general principles” step in to disregard the corporation’s separate
legal status.147 “[L]imited liability is [still] the rule,” but “controlling
principles” imply an exception.148 Similarly, even when parochial notions
of due process might render a foreign judgment unenforceable, a “less
demanding standard” of “international due process” – derived from certain
principles and processes accepted by civilized nations – may be applied to
recognize the judgment.149 The acknowledgment and application of
general principles derived from the positive laws of the forum and other
legal traditions can be the difference between applying a rule of law, and
applying the rule of law. While the former can waver with the shifting
sands of political expediency (often to the detriment of the foreign litigant),
the latter remains stubbornly constant.
This combination of features is precisely what makes the “general
principles of law” so special, and so relevant, to modern transnational
disputes. A court charged with applying a specific national law has both
the duty and the authority to apply it as a whole. This not only includes its
black letter rules, but also the underlying principles that provide intent and
direction to those rules. These principles, then, reaffirm the correct result
as a matter of that law, with no need to determine whether “better” national
rules or the norms of international law should take precedence.150 The

146. Id. at .
147. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S. 611,
613 (1983)
148. Id.
149. Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
150. See Jan Paulsson, Unlawful Laws and the Authority of International Tribunals, 23 ICSID
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outcome “is shown not to be an international imposition on [the applicable]
national law,” but a “vibrant affirmation” of the very foundational core of
that law, backed by the imprimatur of all “civilized nations, our peers.” So
while there is some overlap with traditional doctrines dealing with the
exclusion of foreign law – like public policy – the application of general
principles to guide the outcome of a transnational case is far less intrusive
(and perhaps, when defined correctly, far less arbitrary151). The otherwise
applicable foreign law is not displaced and discarded as contrary to some
parochial sense of “good morals [or] some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal” of the forum.152 Rather, it is applied in its fullest and fairest
sense, checked by the international minimum standard. This is also what
differentiates general principles from applying uniform law instruments
and lex mercatoria, which are non-state sources with little, if any, positive
law footing. But still, the benefit of these non-state sources of law is
realized. “General principles” allow judges to “play their proper role in
ensuring that law does not present itself as a blank sheet of paper upon
which any dictator or dominant group can write laws illegitimate within the
legal order, and thereby debase law itself” – and the transnational
commercial interests that depend upon it. The legal “conscience,”
therefore, remains constant.
And that “conscience,” itself, is self-correcting. Even absent the
doctrines of stare decisis or binding precedent, it is “pointless to resist the
observation” that judicial decisions help “generate norms of international
law.”153 But if one municipal court or international tribunal characterizes a
principle as one of general and universal applicability, the fallout from that
observation should not be exaggerated. It will not instantly bind other
parties and states in their international affairs and disputes, or trigger an
immediate wave of jurisprudential change as a new, formal rule of
international law. That decision will simply enter the fray of all
international judicial decisions, where some shine as “bright[] beacons”

Rev.—FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 215, 221-22 (2008).
151. See, e.g., Davies v. Davies (1887), L. R. 36 C. D. 364 (Kekewich, J., )(“Public policy does
not admit of definition and is not easily explained. It is a variable quantity; it must vary and does vary
with the habits, capacities, and opportunities of the public.”); Besant v. Wood (1879), L. R. 12 C. D.
620 (Jessel, M.R.) (“It is impossible to say what the opinion of a man or a Judge might be as to what
public policy is.”)
152. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918). See also World Duty
Free Company Ltd. v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, ¶¶ 140, 147 (“Domestic
courts generally refer to their own international public policy,” even though “some judgments” do refer
to a “universal conception of public policy”).
153. Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms, in TREATY
ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 879 (2006)
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and become norm-setting examples, while others “flicker and die near
instant deaths.”154 This is a function of the “Darwinian” and nonhierarchical system that permits those decisions that are unfit to be cast
aside. “Good [decisions] will chase the bad, and set standards which will
contribute to a higher level of consistent quality.”155 Only if the decision is
a good one, the characterization a defensible one, and the principle is
indeed a universal one, will a new rule emerge.
This is where judges and scholars come in. In the realm of public
international law, where the general principles were originally meant to
apply, their development has long been stunted by the truncated reasoning
of the international judge. When the ICJ ‘finds’ and applies a general
principle of law, it typically does so without any formal reference or
label.156 And when it does name the source, it never publicizes its
comparative process in divining the principle applied, but rather ipse dixit
simply states that the principle is “admitted in all systems of law,”157 or that
it is “widely accepted as having been assimilated into the catalogue of
general principles of law.”158 To be sure, and as Justice Ginsburg noted in
Intel, the “comparison of legal systems is slippery business, and infinitely
easier to state than to apply.”159 But difficulty cannot be allowed to excuse
the entire exercise.160 Commentators have noted that “[i]t would be

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Jenks, Prospects of International Adjudication, pp. 268-305; Lauterpacht, Development,
pp. 158-72.
157. Corfu Channel Case (PCIJ)
158. Sea-Land Servs. (PCIJ)
159. Intel v. Advanced Micro Systems, 542 U.S. at 252.
160. Indeed, at least one arbitration case was annulled for that very reason. the proper explication
of the relevant principle as one that is indeed grounded in the positive law of all municipal systems is
essential. The case of Klöckner v. Cameroon perhaps the best cautionary tale against the ipse dixit
typically employed by the ICJ. Award, 21 October 1983, 2 ICSID Reports 59-61; Decision on
Annulment, 16 May 1986, 1 ICSID Reports 515. In Klöckner, the applicable law was Cameroonian
law, which in turn is based on French law. Rather than discerning the content of the former, the
Tribunal instead exclusively based its decision on the “basic principle” of “frankness and loyalty” that
can be divined from “French civil law” (while noting without citation that this is also a “universal
requirement” that inheres in all “other national codes which we know of” and both “English law and
international law”). On an application for annulment, the ad hoc Committee found that this truncated
reasoning amounted to a failure to apply the proper law: “Does the ‘basic principle’ referred to by the
Award . . . as one of ‘French civil law’ come from positive law, i.e., from the law’s body of rules? It is
impossible to answer this question by reading the Award, which contains no reference whatsoever to
legislative texts, to judgments, or to scholarly opinions. . . . [The Tribunal’s] reasoning [is] limited to
postulating and not demonstrating the existence of a principle or exploring the rules by which it can
only take concrete form.” Accordingly, the Award was annulled because the Tribunal did not apply
“the law of the Contracting State,” but instead based its decision “more on a sort of general equity than
on positive law . . . or precise contractual provisions.” In other words, the Tribunal’s error was not in
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welcomed not only by the parties but also by the international legal world”
if the reasoning of the Court’s judgments were to explain how it had
examined, by comparative methods, “the assertion that a general principle
of law, having a specified meaning and significance, forms part of binding
general international law.”161
Perhaps the private international law world can do better. In helping
to determine the substance of municipal laws applied to the transnational
scenario, private international law scholars and judges might be better
suited, and better situated, to explicate this source of law beyond its current
state of arcane lore. Public international law scholars understandably spend
their time hovering above the world’s municipal legal systems, descending
to earth when they must but otherwise keeping a firm distance from the
nuance of substantive and procedural rules, let alone the principles that
underlie those rules. Private international law scholars, on the other hand,
draw from diverse pools of municipal law specialists, who spend their days
toiling in the quagmire of transnational procedures, in the comparative
search for common substantive rules. And, after all, their reasoned work is
another venerable source of international law – subsidiary, though
complementary, to the general principles.162
In much the same way, municipal courts are the most common forum
for private international law matters and the primary source of decisions
that hone future precedent in the field. They may also be the most suitable
courts to find and apply general principles of law. International judicial
bodies like the ICJ depend upon the consent of states for their jurisdiction
and their legitimacy. Its judges are understandably reluctant to find and
expressly apply “new” substantive laws – especially those without a formal
basis in state consent – lest they be accused of the unauthorized legislation
of international law. For investment tribunals, too, who are subject to
review and annulment, this is a real worry.163 “The suspicion which states,
especially those on the losing side, may entertain of indirect expansion of
the scope of international law by a tribunal . . . no doubt largely accounts
for the failure of the [international courts] . . . to make any significant use
of this potentially very fertile source of development in international
law.”164 Municipal courts, however, have far fewer worries. With few

resorting to the corrective and supplementary role of international law and general principles of law, but
in not demonstrating the existence of concrete rules under that law as properly applied.
161. Hermann Mosler, supra at 180.
162. ICJ Statute, Art. 38(e)
163. See supra n. 154.
164. Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses Of “General Principles” In The Development Of
International Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 280-81
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exceptions around the world, their jurisdiction and legitimacy is relatively
stable. In the common law tradition, their discretion to resort to general
principles to decide a transnational case before it is relatively unfettered. In
the civil law tradition, that discretion is commonly enshrined in a Code.
So, somewhat ironically, the “courts of civilized nations” may be the best
forum for the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” to
take hold.
*
*
*
There is no sacred principle that pervades all decisions, and neither
justice nor convenience is promoted by rigid adherence to any one principle
as a means to effect justice between litigating parties. And to be sure, the
application of general principles is not a panacea for the promise of
universal justice. Judges are unlikely to exercise their authority to apply
these principles very often. Still, it is important for private international
law as a discipline to see to it that judges know such authority exists; that
they know the application of foreign (or forum) law includes the
application of its foundational norms; and that they know where other
courts have trodden before in doing the same. The intent of this article is to
open our mind’s door to a possible new frontier of private international
law, and to be more than the “railway station” for transnational disputes.

